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BOOK REVIEW 
Hazardous Waste Liability 
By Warren Freedman. Michie Company, Charlottesville, Vir- 
ginia, 1987. Pp. 845 $85.00 (hardcover, Supp. due 1988). 
Warren Freedman of the New York Bar presents a 
splendid one volume synthesis of hazardous waste liability 
that together with Donald Stever's Law of Chemical Regula- 
tion and Hazardous Waste1 will form the two pillars of the 
environmental practitioner's hazardous waste written 
resources. 
In his prologue, Freedman aptly recognizes that hazard- 
ous waste liability may be considered the inscrutable under- 
belly of older tort and statutory remedies. Inscrutable until 
recently, that is, when modern revelations of hazards in long- 
standing industrial practices, preserved by nonexistent regula- 
tion, or quiet circumvention of inadequate regulation, pressed 
these concerns into public awareness and alarm. 
Early in Hazardous Waste Liability, Freedman provides 
helpful definition to his subject matter. Hazardous wastes in- 
clude "(a) inorganic compounds containing toxic or heavy 
metals; (b) inorganic chemical compounds without toxic or 
heavy metals; (c) organic chemicals containing toxic or heavy 
metals; (d) organic chemicals without toxic or heavy metals; 
(e) biological wastes; (f) flammable wastes; and (g) explosive 
wa~tes."~ Because there is frequently a period of long latency 
between personal or property exposure to hazardous waste 
and the discovery of the resulting injury, and because there 
are often extraordinary problems in proving causation, Freed- 
1. D. Stever, Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste (1987). 
2. W. Freedman, Hazardous Waste Liability a t  3-4 (1987). 
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man delineates hazardous waste disposal as "an environmen- 
tal risk that is not immediately ~ontrollable."~ 
The author approvingly quotes Talbor Page's description 
of these environmental risks in terms of ten characteristics: 
(1) when the risk is taken, there is inadequate knowledge 
of the mechanism by which potential harm may result; 
(2) the potential costs of the harm risked are 
catastrophic; 
(3) the costs are externalized a t  the time the decision to 
take the risk is made; 
(4) the benefits of taking the risk are relatively modest; 
(5) the benefits are internalized; 
(6) the harm risked is collective; 
(7) there is a low probability of the harm occurring; 
(8) the low probability is likely to be subjectively 
underestimated; 
(9) the harm risked will not occur for a substantial length 
of time after risky action is taken; and 
(10) the harm is irreversible.' 
In a section entitled "The Apparent Failure of Govern- 
mental Regulation," Freedman castigates slow and labyrin- 
thine state and federal enforcement procedures, laying at the 
door of public bodies responsibility for "the alarming result 
that years may elapse before the pollution is abated."%n im- 
perfect but available solution is the private citizen action. In 
his chapter devoted to private rights of action: Freedman 
observes: 
[clourts have generally been liberal in authorizing indi- 
3. Id.  at 2. 
4. Id.  at 2-3. (quoting Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar 
Risk, 7 Ecology L. Q. 207, 208-24 (1978)). 
5. Id.  at 52. 
6. Ch. 5, The Role of Private Actions in Protecting Public Interests at 219. 
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viduals and organizations representing individuals to 
bring private causes of action, where the individuals live 
in those areas affected by pollution which constitute the 
violations at issue. The organization must, however, 
demonstrate that it represents those individuals, or the 
court will hold that the organization lacks standing to 
sue. . . . [Clorporations showing an injury within their 
zone of interest which injury is protected by the statute 
have [also] been active plaintiffs.' 
The author discusses the salutary effect on citizen stand- 
ing to sue of such actions as Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee C ~ r p . , ~  
in which the Supreme Court held that the Atomic Energy Act 
does not preempt a private punitive damage award arising 
from a nuclear facility; and Doralee Estates v. Cities Service 
Oil Co.,O another affirmance of the imposition of punitive 
damages in a private action. Doralee Estates was brought by a 
property owner against the landlord of an oil terminal dis- 
charging petroleum waste onto the plaintiffs lake and lands in 
proximity to a bungalow colony.1° The author also describes 
the public trust analytical underpinnings to the private right 
of action," and makes reference to the unusual public trust 
embodiment in the Louisiana Constitution, which provides 
that "natural resources of the state, including air and water, 
and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the 
environment shall be protected, conserved and replenished in- 
sofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety and 
welfare of the people." In addition, the Lousiana Constitution 
mandates the legislature to enact laws to implement this 
policy.12 
Concerning implication of a private right of action from a 
statute, the rule remains that a private right may be implied 
in a statute not expressly creating that right where (1) the in- 
7. Freedman, supra note 2, at 221 (citations omitted). 
8. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
9. 569 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1977). 
10. Freedman, supra note 2, at 222. 
11. Id. at 227-30. 
12. La. Const. art. IX, § 1. See also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Con- 
trol Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984). 
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jured party is a member of a group for whose special benefit 
the statute was enacted; (2) the primary purpose of the stat- 
ute would be served by inferring a private right of action; (3) 
there is evidence of legislative intent to create a private right 
of action; and (4) the private right of action is one residing in 
what is traditionally an area of state, rather than federal, con- 
cern.13 Of course citizen suits weigh in most effectively with 
the new generation of environmental laws that expressly pro- 
vide for them. Given life in § 304 of the Clean Air Act,14 a 
majority of federal environmental statutes now include com- 
parable  provision^.'^ Freedman discusses the common juris- 
dictional and injury-in-fact prerequisites of the principal stat- 
utes, and gives an illuminating discussion of the myriad 
obstacles, posed by the courts and defendants alike, to the 
vindication of plaintiffs' claims. 
Later in the volume, the author devotes a chapter to an 
in-depth review of these issues and more. In Chapter 11, 
"Procedural Issues and Procedural Problems Revisited," 
Freedman provides, in the context of the pertinent decisional 
law, a thorough and readable exegis on plaintiffs complaint, 
responsive pleadings, the class action, discovery and pre-trial 
preparation, bifurcation, removal, jury selection, evidence (in- 
cluding expert testimony), and judicial review of agency 
action. 
In two chapters, titled "Causation: Medical, Scientific 
and Legal" and "The Latent Injury, Disease or Death," 
Freedman offers an able analysis of some of the most vexing 
issues in environmental, personal injury and property damage 
litigation: proof of causation, and proof of perpetrator identifi- 
cation. The latter dilemma confronts the attorney whose cli- 
13. Freedman, supra note 2, at 231. See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 
33 (1916) and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
14. 42 U.S.C. 7604 (1982). 
15. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. $ 1365 (1982); Marine 
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1982); Resource Con- 
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1985); Toxic Substances Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. 2619 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1270 (1982); and Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1349(a) (1982). 
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ent "has no idea of what product or substance . . . caused the 
injury, disease or death; [and where] the number of manufac- 
turers ,  d i s t r ibu tors  or  generators  may b e  in t h e  
thousands . . . . ,918 
Of course, once the causative substance and the instru- 
mentality are identified, the plaintiff must still show that the 
hazardous substance was the substantial cause of the injury, 
disease or property damage. The uneven efficacy of epidemio- 
logical evidence is described, together with a section titled 
"Reform of Causation Principles."" Of one proposal for a 
sliding scale burden of proof, pursuant to which a plaintiff al- 
leging harm from a very risky and minimally beneficial activ- 
ity would face a lower burden of proof than would the plain- 
tiff claiming comparable harm from a beneficial activity, 
Freedman responds: "Such a proposal requires a court to 
make an extraordinarily difficult cost-benefit and risk-benefit 
decision, and a t  the same time encourages the plaintiff to  
overstate the risk of harm in order to take advantage of a 
lower burden of proof."18 
A review can provide only a glimpse of the author's work, 
and, ideally, a vicarious appreciation of sound, practical schol- 
arship, well executed and attractively presented. The author, 
the publisher, and the practitioner should savor the result. 
M. Stuart Madden* 
16. Freedman, supra note 2, at 291. 
17. Id.  at 296-98. 
18. Id.  at 296. 
* M. Stuart Madden, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, 
B.A. University of Pennsylvania, M.A. London School of Economics, J.D. Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
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